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Deleuze's Oxygen Machine

I. Introduction – (A) Philosophical Suicide

On November 4th, 1995 Gilles Deleuze's body exited the window of his Parisian apartment, and fell to the ground below. Deleuze left no note of which we are aware, but it has been generally assumed that the act itself was one of suicide by defenestration, and that the circumstances surrounding the scene itself were in no sense suspicious or questionable (Dosse 2010: 498; Beckman 2017: 108). In this sense, as regards the act as an orchestration of objects and bodies, there was nothing to suggest foul play, and there has been no further speculation on the matter.

This is not so straightforwardly the case, however, when we approach the situation through the lens of Deleuzian philosophy. It has often been noted that when we take into account the emphasis upon affirmation and vitality in Deleuzian thought, and its resistance to the attitudes and stances of *ressentiment*, the circumstances of Deleuze's self-murder become rather more conspicuous (Sweeney-Turner 1996: 194, 195; Dosse 2010: 498). That is to say, if seen as a form of *philosophical* suicide, the death of Deleuze becomes suspect, and his motives somewhat bewildering.

Accordingly, writings on Deleuze's suicide often attempt to reconcile the nature of his death at his own hand with some particular aspect of Deleuzian thought, with the aim of rescuing his philosophy from a similar fate (Beaulieu and Ord 2017: 121-130; Sweeney-Turner 1996: Dosse 2010: 499-501; Weaver 2004: 70-73). In this fashion, commentators such as David Flemming (2017), Rosie Braidotti (2010), Finn Janning (2013) and André Pierre Colombat (1996) have attempted to present Deleuze's defenestration in a quasi-affirmative fashion, by placing it in positive dialogue with one or more concepts precious to Deleuzian and Deleuzo-Guattarian philosophy (for example, making oneself a body without organs, rejecting the time of Chronos and embracing the time of Aion, or exploring the relationship between Spinoza's conatus, and an all pervasive encounter with negative affect). Typically, in the context of such writings, there is an attempt to avoid the charge of hypocrisy, by demonstrating a compatibility between Deleuze's final actions and the central tenets and recurring motifs of his and Guattari's work, or, in a similarly integrative fashion, by seeking to frame his manner of death as a kind of performative statement (Seigworth 1995; Alliez 1996; Janning 2013; Cohen and Ramlow 2005/2006).

An alternative approach, in some ways no less concerned with consistency or justification, attempts to re-evaluate the circumstances surrounding Deleuze's defenestration,

positioning his death as an unfortunate accident, or positing the notion that Deleuze threw himself from his window in a state of diminished responsibility – a state which might be attributed to the effects of medication, or to over/under oxygenation. To this end, Michel Serres, interviewed in the weeks following Deleuze's death, envisaged an entirely contingent and happenstantial course of events, whilst taking the act of suicide to be totally incommensurable with Deleuze's life, disposition and work - "It was impossible to breathe - he opened the window and ...[It was] not in his character. Not in his philosophy. It was impossible" (Kunzru and Serres 1995). In a similar fashion, the case for diminished responsibility was boldly proposed by Simon Critchley in his *The Book of Dead Philosophers*, which drew attention to the ground floor location of respiratory wings in hospitals, and to the iron bars that can frequently be found upon their windows, before going on to suggest that it is not uncommon for patients on such wards to leap or to fall to their death (Critchley 2008: 237). Traces of a similar, broadly compatible sentiment, can be found in the remarks by Jean-Pierre Faye, published in the newspaper *Libération*, just a few days after Deleuze's passing. In attempting to depict the 'terrible moment' in which Deleuze '[could] no longer breath and [wanted] to join the air by diving towards death, from the height of a window", Faye envisioned an instant of impetuous action (Faye 1995), a sentiment later echoed by both the architectural theorist Stephen Perrella's vision of "the (desperate) reflex of a human reduced to an animal" (Flemming 2017: 59), and Douglas Ord's description of the falling Deleuze as an at once mindless and impulsive 'gasping fish' (Ord 2014: 36).

Critchley's account of Deleuze's suicide is rather brief, and somewhat divorced from philosophical analysis. It's reliance on the speculative and the anecdotal seems intended to sidestep any philosophical complications, as does his formulation of a distinctly non-philosophical, medical excuse. Thus, for Critchley, Deleuze simply may not have been in

his right mind (whatever that might mean) as he leapt from the window of his apartment. It is not so much that the hypothesis of deliberate and intentional suicide is incapable of being integrated with Deleuzian thought, or addressed in Deleuzian terms, it is rather that any attempt to align this depiction of Deleuze's action with his philosophical corpus involves its assessment alongside a collection of maladies that are portrayed by Deleuze and Guattari in a broadly negative fashion. That is to say, from the perspective of Deleuze and Guattari's *A Thousand Plateaus*, suicide must be viewed as an outcome of an overly rapid and untrammelled descent into chaos – an instantiation of the black hole which they find common to addiction, hypochondria, schizophrenia, paranoia and masochism (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 150, 163). Each of these conditions are depicted as failed lines of flight, or 'botched' attempts to discover the Body without Organs, which can all too easily lead to self-destruction, or to self-annihilation.

... How necessary caution is, the art of dosages, since overdose is a danger... in dismantling the organism there are times one courts death You don't reach the BwO, and its plane of consistency, by wildly destratifying. ... If you free it with too violent an action, If you blow apart the strata without taking precautions, then instead of drawing the plane you will be killed, plunged into a black hole, or even dragged toward catastrophe. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 160, 161)

When taking this into account, notions of hypocrisy and contradiction once more loom large. Indeed, it is perhaps this tension that underpins Faye's indication in *Libération*, that he ultimately experienced 'great difficulty in supporting' Deleuze's decision, or being in any sense invested in the instant in which he chose to jump (Faye 1995: 38).

For Deleuze, however, matters of legal deliberation, must resist the application of overarching principles, and should be considered from a jurisprudential perspective - in a

case by case fashion, as it were (Lefebvre 2008: 56, 57). Seen in its specificity, this negative re-integration of Deleuze's action with Deleuze and Guattari's philosophical project serves to foreground a number of interesting points concerning the notions of culpability, responsibility, forgiveness and remorse. Firstly, in the case of the coupling of Deleuze to his oxygen machine, the dependency upon oxygen, and any resulting intoxication that followed would likely be to some extent involuntary, serving to diminish responsibility, and thus culpability, for the action that ensued. In this sense, Deleuze's plight, though potentially involving both insatiable need and a kind of intoxication, is nevertheless one step removed from that of the addict, who more directly chooses their situation and circumstance. Similarly, if we are to take the notion of death at one's own hand seriously, and treat Deleuze's actions as a kind of homicide, his and Guattari's detailed understanding, and negative assessment of the nature of such action might likewise serve as a footing for remorse on the part of the murderous Deleuze, offering a path towards forgiveness that could be taken by his followers – a journey perhaps affirmed through their construction of more positive modes of philosophical integration and interpretation.

II. Post Rationalisation and Planning

Most philosophical explanations of Deleuze defenestration, regardless of positive or negative stance, must be seen to arrive after the fact – serving as philosophical post-rationalisations, or reterritorialisations of the event. As we have seen, the majority of engagements with Deleuze's suicide take this form, utilising the tension between Deleuze's action and his philosophical system as a means of unpacking and exploring elements of his philosophy, and it is rare that there is any richer speculation regarding motive, the conditions that might have

given rise to the impulse, or what factors might have informed or driven the event of Deleuze's death.

There is, however, one notable exception to this rule, which was authored by Beaulieu and Ord and presented in an earlier edition of this journal (Beaulieu and Ord 2017). Pushing against any notion of impulsive action, the authors envisaged Deleuze's defenestration as involving careful and scrupulous rational planning, whilst also inviting us to consider his leap into the void in performative terms. In one sense, their invitation for us to consider the 'evential' dimension of Deleuze's death, and their discussion of this as a passage from molarity to molecularity, or as a passage from the time of Chronos into the time of Aion, plays into the mode of affirmative post-rationalisation that characterises many other articles. However, there is another sense in which their foregrounding of the significance of the date of November 4th is particularly distinctive (Beaulieu and Ord 2017: 132; Ord 2014: 34, 35). That is to say, Beaulieu and Ord draw attention to the fact that the date in question marks both Deleuze's passage through the window of his apartment, and Alice's passage through the looking glass, in the context of Lewis Carroll's fiction (Carroll 2010). Thus, over the course of their paper, they establish a 'resonance', firstly between two instances of a recurring chronological date, secondly with Deleuze's philosophical concerns with the molecular, the eternal, and becoming imperceptible, and lastly, with the incorporeal influence of events that occur in Lewis Carroll's novel, that would seem to have nevertheless impinged upon a number of actual bodies. These include the window to Deleuze's apartment, the surface of the street below - and not least, the body of Deleuze himself

III. Evidence, Resonance and Repetition

Beaulieu and Ord's writing is both fascinating and troubling with respect to the compelling sense of closure that it induces within the reader. Simultaneously adopting the tenor of detective, prosecution, and defence, the authors offer an actualist mode of evidentiality, which exploits the order of the calendar in order to collapse events not only distant in time, but also different in constitution - from the embodied, non-fictional events which took place at 84, Avenue Niel in the 17th arrondissement of Paris, to the fictional, incorporeal, (though in another sense, no less embodied) events that occur in Carroll's novel. Beaulieu and Ord are thorough in their detective work. They present a seemingly airtight case - as questions begin to rise, our breath falls away. It is as if, at every turn, the wind falls from our sails.

It is the peculiar sense of completion arising out of Beaulieu and Ord's account, that we wish to contest here, whilst at the same time applauding the integration of philosophical, literary, corporeal and incorporeal resources in framing their investigation.

Our own encounter with the event of Deleuze's suicide will be conducted through a design fictional lens (Hales 2013; 2016) and in the abductive spirit of artistic research (Roberts 2015: 155), with a view to facilitating a broader discussion of the nature of Deleuze's passing, through the speculative investigation of an architectural scene of a crime. By utilising the Deleuzo-Guattarian concept of assemblage, acknowledging its lineage through the concept of desiring machines (Buchanan 2021: 12, 13; de Assis 2021: 12-14), and foregrounding its actively process-relational dimension, as is evidenced, by the term *agencement* (assemblage) in its untranslated form (Nail 2017: 22, Buchanan 2015: 383, de Assis 2021: 12-16), we will consider Deleuze's act of defenestration more broadly, applying it as much to Deleuze's pulmonary condition, and the architecture of his philosophical system, as to his relationship with Guattari and to architecture per se. In so

doing, we wish to balance the highly focused, analytic evidentiality of aspects of Beaulieu and Ord's argument, with a schizoanalytic approach that is perhaps more in tune with Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy. That is to say, there is a sense in which Beaulieu and Ord's desire to present a kind of proof, or evidence, results in a claim that is almost *too factual*, and which, as such, overshadows the broader, more schizoanalytic potential of its other, more subtle, constitutive elements.

The majority of responses to Deleuze's death that have been discussed thus far, proceed via a form of deduction – seeking a consistent and integrative logic to Deleuze's action from somewhere within his oeuvre. As we have seen, Beaulieu and Ord's account is distinctive in its empirical, evidential, but no less integrative approach. Arguably, such strategies speak more to the epistemological machinations of Royal Science - oriented 'at all times and in all places' by 'reproduction, induction and deduction' and 'the presentation of a fixed, external perspective' (Deleuze and Guattari 1998: 372) - than they do to the at once relational and mutable conception of subjectivity that is suggested by the method of schizoanalysis. That is to say, from a schizoanalytic perspective, all subjectivity, including that of Gilles Deleuze, arises out of a complex flow of desires, intensities, and socio-political forces – and as such, we should avoid the temptation of any overly reductive mapping, however consoling this may seem.

In addressing Deleuze's suicide as an assemblage, we must consider a complex relational amalgam of *things/objects* and *intensities* (de Assis 2018: 25) that stands against any conception of fundamental essence, or secret to Deleuze's final act. Given that an assemblage is constituted as a body of external relations, we must recognise its mutability, and its simultaneously syncretic, contingent and transformative, constitution. That is to say, if seen as an active multiplicity of bodies and forces, the assemblage of Deleuze's suicide resists any

singular, overarching, conception or rational plan. This is not to suggest that a plan cannot play a part in, or even seem to dominate, a suicide – but it is important to recognise that a plan in some sense emerges from, or forms a part of a broader situational assemblage, and that despite its seemingly overwhelming call for attention there are still intensities to be mapped and explored.

Accordingly, we approach the event of Deleuze's defenestration as a series of interconnected multiple deaths – and investigate the status of each. To make sense of such questions we will explore Deleuze's coupling, in concrete terms, with the oxygen cylinders that kept him alive, and to which he felt notoriously "hooked/tied/chained like a dog" (Dosse 2011: 497; Johnson 2017: 270; Goodchild 1986: 1), and his similarly umbilical tether to his collaborator Guattari – a figure sometimes overlooked, and sometimes positioned as the more pragmatic, but philosophically lesser party – who is often taken to have in some sense grounded Deleuze's more esoteric claims, or to have brought them down to earth, so to speak. Lastly, we will consider the somewhat tensile relationship between the embodiment of Deleuze in his final days, and the incorporeal force of his own philosophical system, in a bid to explore the ways in which the act of defenestration might transform the relentless repetition of philosophical paradox, into a more open expression of desiring production.

November the 4th, November the 4th Remember, remember the 4th of November ...

Haunted by the temporal dislocation of this refrain, and by the cyclic insistence of chronological time, we return to the claims of Beaulieu and Ord, in a bid to ascertain why this pairing of dates should feel so pressing. Resisting the sense of closure that accompanies their narrative, we begin with the observation that in the context of his novel, Carroll never once explicitly mentions the date in question, and that the authors must lead

us from Carroll's comments concerning the gathering of wood for the bonfire that is to take place on the following day, to the inference of the date of Alice's passage (Beaulieu and Ord 2017: 132). Whilst this observation is not intended to dispute any resonance or intersection of times, it should begin to trouble the image of a decisive rational plan, or a significant, performative spectacle – bringing to the fore the rhetorical and quasi-numerological sway of Beaulieu and Ord's writing, which trades upon the transformative force of a series of indiscernible numbers, imperceptibly present, yet quite palpably felt.

Whilst the affinity between Deleuze's window and Alice's looking glass had been noticed by the artist and researcher Julian Weaver as early as 1995 (Weaver 1995: 69, 73, 74), the duality of dates seemed to escape his attention, as was the case with family, friends and those closest to Deleuze (Ord 2014:37). The length of time required for commentators to notice this connection, however, whilst not entirely eliminating the possibility that Deleuze's suicide had a performative dimension, should nevertheless serve to temper any sense of communicative urgency - raising the possibility, as Aphonso Lingis has suggested, that in deciding to leap from the window of his private apartment, as opposed to some more public location, 'Deleuze was not making a statement to others by the way he chose to die' (Lingis 2006: 1). In view of this, and writing these words on November the 4th, in the year of 2021, we question the gravity of Beaulieu and Ord's case, whilst emphasising the circumstantial nature of the evidence acquired.


Turning from questions of content to questions of form, we might likewise query the totalising quality of Beaulieu and Ord's narrative. Their discussion of the significance of the date of Deleuze's death is couched in concepts of association and the construction of external relations (Beaulieu and Ord 2017: 133) with Beaulieu and Ord suggesting that, in throwing himself from his window, Deleuze's attempted to actively establish a resonance

between fictional and non-fictional events. It is telling, however, that prior to this, in the context of his original doctoral thesis, Ord framed Deleuze's action as a kind of repetition – albeit a repetition with difference (Ord 2014: 39, 47). This slide between repetition and resonance begins to reveal, firstly, the way in which Beaulieu and Ord's argument retains traces of the concepts of representation and recognition, which are much castigated in the context of Deleuzian philosophy, and secondly, the way in which it suffers from a generalised weakness of import that is exhibited by arguments from analogy per se. That is to say, Beaulieu and Ord's argument can be seen to straddle a peculiar philosophical fault-line - on the one hand, the further Deleuze's action is said to lean towards a mode of repetition, or a kind of performative re-enactment, the stronger will be the sense of significance surrounding the event, but the more it will fall foul of Deleuze antipathy towards the faculty of re-cognition. On the other hand, however, the more the events of Alice and Deleuze's passage can be said, in the first instance, to differ, the less persuasive the connection will become, making it harder to instil the state of abductive conjecture that is required to actively reframe a situation. Things become further complicated when we consider Deleuze's and Guattari's hatred of what they sardonically refer to as 'interpretosis' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 114). Indeed, it is hard to believe that Deleuze would bequeath to his friends a mystery – and less still, a mystery with a solution that is laden with traces of repetition, re-enactment and the reconstruction of an event. Such inconsistencies, arising out of the evidential dimension of Beaulieu and Ord's case, seem rather at odds with Deleuze's philosophical approach - although perhaps not quite so much as the act of suicide itself.

With this in mind, we likewise adopt the voice of philosophical detectives – a register that seems fitting given the necessarily speculative nature of the enquiry. However, strongly resisting Beaulieu and Ord's depiction of rationally planned demise, we return to questions

of impulse, intolerability, and quality of life, whilst broadening the analysis of pain to move beyond the more typical references to suffocation and difficulties in breathing, to explore the potential for *philosophical* discomfort. Against the pictures of totalising rationality, affirmative philosophical integration, and references to profound physical disquiet that abound in the extant literature on Deleuze death, we mobilise Deleuze's writings on Sade and Sacher-Masoch (1991), in order to construct our own contribution to the ever complexifying assemblage of Deleuze's death - turning to questions of paradox, repetition, transformation, and escape.

IV. The Architectural Exterior



[Image redacted: Bernard Tschumi, *Advertisements for Architecture*, 2000.]

Between 1976 and 1977 Bernard Tschumi produced a series of images entitled ‘Advertisements for Architecture’ (Tschumi 1979; Buckley 2014). One such image depicts a figure, plummeting through the air before the façade of a building - apparently having fallen from an open window above. A second figure leans from the window with arms outstretched. The image is captioned “To really appreciate architecture, you may even need to commit a murder”. We proceed from the premise that the falling man is Deleuze, and that the figure in the window above is Guattari – or perhaps his ghost, following his own death from a cardiac arrest, roughly three years earlier. Thus, we adapt this image to inform the design fictional scenario that conditions our investigation.

V. The Architectural Interior

For Tschumi, a poststructuralist architect, perhaps closer to Derrida, and Deconstruction than to Deleuze, ‘architecture ... cannot be dissociated from the events that “happen” in it’ (Tschumi 1996: 139). Approaching the scene of the crime, our architectural detective, would, we suggest, diagram the predictable repetition of events inside Deleuze’s apartment – a strategy which might be extended to a similarly predictable series of events occurring within the Deleuzian philosophical system – in order to develop an account of an architectural space as a *sequence*: or as what Bernard Cache, a former student of Deleuze’, and perhaps the architect more explicitly allied to Deleuzian thought, subsequently termed a *cinema* of things (Cache 1995: 28). Cache’s cinema of things is comparable to Tschumi’s set of partially determined, linear series of actions and behaviours made-up, as it were, or fabricated, by and from the space itself.

In approaching the scene of the crime, we are confronted with the elements of the concrete assemblage – the apartment, the oxygen machine, the *Large Glass* of the window, and Deleuze’s body, lying prostrate on the pavement below. Recent commentary on the

contemporary assemblage theories of DeLanda, Latour and Bennett, has drawn attention to their tendency to focus almost exclusively upon connections between corporeal bodies, equipment, and objects, to the detriment of the Deleuzian assemblage's abstract/incorporeal, but nevertheless co-constitutive face (Buchanan 2015: 390,391; 2017: 471, 463; 2021: 33,34 ; Nail 2015: 24, 25; de Assis 2021: 11). Critics such as Buchanan and de Assis have noted the lack of engagement of post-Deleuzian assemblage theories with the linguistic, symbolic and semiotic dimensions of reality that nevertheless feature prominently in the thought of Deleuze, and which likewise form an important part of our own design fictional approach. Accordingly, will focus upon a discussion, and manipulation of concrete things and their discernible relations, whilst at times utilising a more poetic, fabulatory register in an attempt to activate and engage the assemblages incorporeal face.

VI. Fabulation and Design Fictioning.

The Bergsonian and Deleuzian concepts of fabulation have many similarities, but ultimately take divergent paths. The former, arising out of Bergson's discussion of 'static religion' in the context of 'closed societies', addresses as a somewhat reactionary, and conservative phenomena. Bergson argued that socially conservative fabulations, which he closely associated with religious contexts, consist in 'phantasmic representations' of spirits, forces and gods, which are brought forth, as a means of preventing heretical activity or reinforcing social cohesion in the face of 'the shock of an event'. When delineating this concept, Bergson stressed the affective context of the fabulatory - drawing attention to its hallucinogenic qualities. His example, strangely pertinent to the context of our discussion, concerned a woman who, about to unwittingly step into an open lift shaft, 'suddenly felt herself thrust backward', believing that the lift operator had appeared, with

arms outstretched (mirroring Tschumi's depiction of Guattari, above), and pushed her back to safety. Bergson notes, in a statement that is in many ways applicable to the emergence of post-rationalisations of Deleuze's philosophical suicide, that 'She had been about to throw herself into the void [but] a miraculous hallucination had saved her life' (Bergson 1932: 1076–7/120). The spirits, forces, and gods that are brought forth in the wake of Deleuze's suicide, discussed above, include a set of esoteric, but highly orthodox Deleuzian concepts, along with the prelude to Alice's adventure, each of which offers a distinctive hallucinatory way of seeing, promising consistency and reintegration in the face of a closed, but now disrupted, Deleuzian orthodoxy.

Turning to the 'political' transformation of the fabulatory that took place in Deleuze's hands, we can explore the generative legacy of Deleuze's demise. Ronald Bogue, addressing the 'leap forward' that occurs as a part of the 'shock' of the fabulatory event, emphasises the way in which such eventualities can facilitate transformative shifts, through their problematisation of the beliefs of a prevailing societal structure (in this case, 'Deleuzianism' or the Deleuzian community). Such a shift not only contradicts, or 'falsifies' those established beliefs, but also creatively generates its own truths – demonstrating the 'power of the false', and its ability to affectively generate new lines of thought. In this sense, the Deleuzian take on the concept of fabulation is closely linked to the construction and extension of an assemblage, and to the notion of 'collective enunciation', that is implicated in the construction of a 'people to come'. Bogue, emphasises the way in which this more futural moment is no less hallucinatory, but is this time oriented by a mode of 'clairvoyance' in which the 'intolerable becomes suddenly visible' when the future is no longer burdened by the past. Importantly, there is a reciprocity between the shock of the event and the community that emerges, with each being implicated in the move away from

established truths and orthodoxies, towards only partially defined, but no less powerful potentials.

Following Deleuze's death we have seen the emergence of number of post-Deleuzian movements, along with a rising interest in Guattarian philosophy. These movements have included speculative realism (object-oriented ontology), new materialism, accelerationism, and non-philosophy, all of which can be seen to have in some sense tempered Deleuzian affirmation, whilst accentuating other aspects of Deleuzian thought.

VII. Design Fictioning as Non-Philosophy

Our own design fictional method is in some sense 'non-philosophical' in its refusal of the hegemonic dimension of philosophy itself and in its embrace of the ontologically, and epistemologically pluralistic constitution of reality – aiming to produce Deleuzian fabulations and semi-fictional assemblages through the combination of a plurality of theories, images, anecdotes, allusions, metaphors, associations, constructive falsehoods, and performative interventions. It is particularly 'design fictional' in so far as it brings consideration (and subversion) of designed objects and design methodologies into the foreground, in order to both reflect upon and problematise the way in which the designed environment can all too easily serve to stymie creative potential. Thus, an overtly fictitious reading of Tschumi's promotional poster, enables a set of aspectual shifts which give rise to imaginative, but no less pertinent lines of enquiry. In this fashion, the falling figure of Deleuze, set against a blurred architectural and philosophical façade, becomes torn between the push and pull of outstretched arms, belonging at once to Guattari and to Bergson's hallucinatory lift attendant. Similarly, utilising Tschumi's methods alongside an envisaging of the apartment as a maquette, enables an 'evential' mapping, which leads first to a breaking of sequence, and finally to the figure of Deleuze, falling through Tschumi's architectural frame. Our design

fictional scenarios draw attention to the multi-modal and pluralistic constitution of a reality, which includes philosophy, but only as one of its many dimensions. Similarly, our various suggestions for motive in the context of the event will draw out the generative, multivalent complexity of the assemblage of Deleuze's death(s), along with the many planes and plateaus of discomfort that must be combined when considering the characteristics of his at once philosophical and corporeal, pulmonary condition.

VIII. The Disruption of a Territory

In the context of Deleuzo-Guattarian philosophy, the concept of assemblage is intimately tied to questions of rhythm, order and transformation. Thomas Nail has discerned in the writings of Deleuze and Guattari, four orders of political arrangement - the territorial, the state, the capitalist and the nomadic, which are deemed to be operative, albeit to different degrees, in any given assemblage (Nail 2017: 28). The territorial assemblage, focused as it is upon the division of the world into normatively coded sections, draws close to Cache (1995:28) and Tschumi's notions of cinema and sequencing (1996:153-171). Accordingly, it is consideration of the place of Deleuze's oxygen machine within the setting of his apartment, that will enable us to address the territorial dimension of the assemblage in both spatial and temporal terms, whilst also raising the spectre of the lived philosophical paradox that would have become increasingly pervasive as Deleuze's condition deteriorated.

In *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari draw attention to the way in which the segmentation of a house into rooms is aligned with a set of domestic activities, and how such activities are themselves derived from a functional conception of what constitutes "natural or proper" usage (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 208). Thus, the house mirrors the organism, along with essentialist conceptions of its essence or nature, with rooms

sectioned off according to different functions (e.g. sleeping, cooking, defecating, studying, lounging).

However, alongside the functional dimension of the home, Deleuze and Guattari foreground its sonorous occupation, noting that the diverse sounds of an individual's domestic habitation offer an alternative, more idiosyncratic form of consistency that supervenes upon this more basic architectural structure. In his commentary on *A Thousand Plateaus*, Brent Adkins draws attention to the invasion of "car alarms" along with "the thumping bass from passing cars", and observes their violation of domestic territory - calling to mind Deleuze and Guattari's image of the house as a structure for filtering the external forces of chaos (Adkins 2015: 175 ; Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 311). It is in this sense that Deleuze's oxygen machine offers a particularly imposing, and pervasively disruptive presence, which encroaches upon the patterning of its domestic space. It is the disturbed territory of Deleuze's home which will provide the setting for the disruption of his body, through the mechanised institution of the twelve to twenty breaths per minute, that constitute the pulmonary rhythm of a healthy adult. This image of assisted ventilation, as a mode of temporal organisation is alternately, vital, and disciplinary in character, resulting in a paradox of vitality, sustenance, and of breath brought to rule, that is difficult to resolve from within the framework of Deleuzian thought. Accordingly, it begins to suggest a picture of bodily and philosophical discomfort, that will be developed further over the course of this article.

The image of Deleuze's oxygen cylinders first colonising and then usurping the territory of his apartment, leads to consideration of a second, equally conservative dimension of the assemblage. The severing, inhibition, and slowing down of relations with external elements that is characteristic of the *statist* assemblage becomes evident as we reflect upon

the way in which the oxygen machine would have taken root, as it where - offering vital sustenance, whilst impeding the intake of any oxygen external to their coupling (such as might be found in the apartment, or on the street outside). As the use of the machine intensified, and the apparatus became further established, it would encroach ever more upon Deleuze's domestic circumstance – serving to further diminish life, by covering over, and smothering its potentials.

The masochist is looking for a type of BwO that only pain can fill, or travel over, due to the very conditions under which that BwO was constituted. Pains are populations, packs, modes of king-masochist-in-the-desert that he engenders and augments. The same goes for the drugged body and intensities of cold, refrigerator waves. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 152)

In formulating their notion of desiring machines, the conceptual forerunner to the idea of assemblage, in their very first collaborative paper, Deleuze and Guattari make reference to Man Ray's surrealist collage, entitled *Dancer Danger: l'impossibilité* (1917-20). They note how Man Ray's image, which appears to depict the whirl of a mechanised Spanish dancer, offers 'two degrees of absurdity' in so far as the dancer's internal cogs, gears, and larger transmission wheel, through a combination of physical and logical impossibility, are ultimately unable to function (Deleuze and Guattari 2009: 91).

At first glance, the at once impotent and disorderly mechanism of Man Ray's image stands in stark contrast to the more functionally robust coupling that seems constitutive of the concrete assemblage of Deleuze-oxygen-machine, which if anything, perhaps worked a little too well – resulting in a somewhat mechanical and totalitarian unity, along with a paradox of over-specialisation. Whilst the machine which gave succour to Deleuze's life, clearly excelled with respect to its primary function - namely the rhythmic manipulation of Deleuze's

pulmonary system – it was likewise generative of considerable physical discomfort, and a corresponding inability on Deleuze part to focus, concentrate, or to any longer develop his philosophical projects. Accordingly, the oxygen machine, in this fusion of positive and negative affects, served to prolong Deleuze's life, whilst at the same time diminishing his capacity for desire – an observation perhaps supported by Ryan Johnson's comment that in his final days, Deleuze found it impossible to work, and was barely capable of holding, let alone lifting, a pen (Johnson 2017: 270).

This slightly myopic focus upon the coupling of Deleuze with his oxygen machine should not distract from the inherently complex nature of the assemblage per se, which Deleuze and Guattari describe as an ever-changing multiplicity of heterogeneous elements, constituted, variously, by semiotic, material and social flows (Deleuze and Guattari 1998: 22, 23). It is particularly important to recognise that in order for an assemblage to emerge, a plurality of flows and connections are required (de Assis 2018: 83). Whilst the despotic and overbearing quality of Deleuze's life-giving apparatus, could be said to reveal one particularly statist facet of the much broader assemblage constituting Deleuze's suicide, we might equally have drawn attention to the various micro-fascistic attempts to return Deleuze's auto-destructive actions to the landscape of Deleuzian, state-philosophical orthodoxy. Such practices likewise involve a slowing down or inhibition of connection, but in this case to an anomalous or heretical philosophical outside.

Thus far we have focused almost exclusively upon the territorially conservative aspects of the assemblage, whilst bringing them to bear upon the establishment, maintenance and usurping of territories. The remaining facets of the assemblage, are less conservative in character, being more broadly concerned with propagation and transformation. The capitalist mode of the assemblage, is concerned with the circulation, migration and reproduction of flows,

through the construction of a set of impersonal axioms that can be made generally reproducible (Nail 2017: 31,32). In this sense, the treatment of Deleuze's pulmonary condition, once divested of any qualitative concerns, can be seen to engage with an impersonal set of axioms, attached in this case to the mechanised circulation of air –which apply as much to the functionality of an oxygen machine, as they do to that of a dehumidifier, or to an air conditioning unit. However, as was the case with the statist assemblage, its capitalist dimension might be refocused to address the dissemination of Deleuzian and Deleuzo-Guattarian philosophy through the circulation of their ideas in the burgeoning industry of secondary literature (of which this essay forms a part), and in the migration of their ideas into the adjunct, non-philosophical territories, of art and architecture.

We must keep such complexities in mind, as we imagine Tschumi's mapping and sequencing of Deleuze's apartment – a process which will extend into a mapping of Deleuze's philosophical and situational milieu. Such an undertaking will equip us for an exploration of the final, nomadic dimension of the assemblage, ultimately turning our gaze towards the radical break with spatial, temporal and philosophical sequence, that constitutes the event of Deleuze's death.

IX. Mapping and Sequencing the Apartment

What little we can know of this space? Peering through its window, it is likely that the room beyond contains an oxygen machine - a machine once barely used, but latterly more frequently deployed. This room, on occasion, also contained Deleuze, perhaps at times sequencing and plotting his own demise – at once audience, director and orchestrator of an ideational cinema of things-

How might we discern the frustration and flow of Deleuze's domestic desire? The obvious description of a life curbed or dissatisfied seem to strain when we consider Deleuze's self-ascribed affinity with the raised mound of earth that constitutes a 'hill', along with his description of his thought as 'changing very little' and his body as 'not moving very much' (Deleuze 2006: 237; Ballantine 2010: 17). Qualifying this image further, Deleuze presented himself as obsessing over his ideas, and being unable to manage more than one project at a time – going so far as to suggest that the few movements that he undertook were primarily 'internal' to his mental life (Deleuze 2006: 218).

Deleuze's depiction of himself contrasts starkly with the frenetic vibrancy that he attributed to Guattari. For Deleuze, Guattari was like the sea – "he always seems to be in motion, sparkling with light. He can jump from one activity to another. He doesn't sleep much, he travels, he never stops. He never *ceases*. He has extraordinary speeds" (ibid. p. 237). Guattari died, perhaps most appropriately, of a cardiac arrest in 1992, where the air was thick with pragmatic activism, in the space of encounter, close to his patients at La Borde.

Given these divergences in lifestyle, it seems apt, that Deleuze should produce more esoteric, philosophical works, and that these should be in some sense actualised when oxygenated in their encounter with Guattari. Equally, however, the image of Deleuze's life as one of lived withdrawal, would seem to cast doubt upon his inability to live longer term with the immobilising aspects of his condition. It is difficult to imagine how restricted movement could markedly affect the life of one who had at times considered himself an improbably portable hill – or as possessed of indeterminate spatial dimensions (for what and how many are the dimensions of a hill?).

With a model or maquette of the scene of the crime, we might envisage the proportions of nested spaces. Thus, we might depict Deleuze's plight in the form of a dioramic model of a landscape, or as a terrarium installed within a domestic space. Tschumi, our architectural detective, explains that "*There is no space without event...no architecture without program.*" (Tschumi 1996: 139).

Tschumi began to explore his ideas of architectural space and the event as programme through the production of what he called transcripts: each "transcript" included black and white diagrams breaking down a range of event-scenes that might occur inside an architectural space (Tschumi 1994: 18, 43). We utilise this methodology to construct from Tschumi's image of a falling man, our own mode of architecture fiction. Tschumi drew his diagrams in a way that resembled dance notation or the spatial analysis of a film scene. He was concerned here with spaces and their use; the set and the script; type and program; object and events (Tschumi 1996: 4-7)

In Tschumi's dramatic frame we see Deleuze falling in an arc from his apartment window, an aperture which likewise frames the apparition of Guattari – as murderer, or as prospective saviour, failing in his attempt to interrupt the passage of Deleuze's body, first through a plane of horizontality, and then vertically, across an at once architectural and philosophical façade – the projectile body of a disappearing subject.

This is an event that must be projected, not anamorphically (Pérez-Gómez and Pelletier, 1995:161), but through a stereotomy of surfaces and cuts as employed in the making of gravestones (ibid. p. 164). In this fashion, we project beyond this initial scene to assign to the diegesis, out of frame, and into an image of nothingness - the design of Deleuze's tomb, in the vault of Grandjouan Lévêque in the cemetery of Saint-Léonard-de-Noblat (Dosse 2010: 501; Sarka-SPIP 2020).

This makes of Deleuze's hill, a burrow or barrow – the mound of earth and stones that are raised over a grave. We must also consider the importance of air to the façade that the disindividuating Deleuze crosses; and to the pavement, concretised as a becoming molecular. Where do the key protagonists stand (or in Deleuze's case fall) during key moments of the mystery, or of this experience of a 'forced movement', in the analysis of the event as a crime scene?

X. The Protagonists, Conceptual Personae, Dramatis Personae

From the perspective of Tschumi's transcripts of event-scenes, in the case of Deleuze's self-murder, Deleuze does something radically out of sequence, breaking with the established habits or patterns of use and occupation that a building might imply. Taking Deleuze's act of defenestration, as a prime example of this kind of break, we might seek to map the planning of such a crime: how to instigate such a breakthrough? Did Deleuze plan to pass through the pane of glass, or was the passage to be unimpeded, continuous? Is the window to be carefully plotted as already open, how many locks need to be picked, bolts unbolted? And each of these procedures might be extended to the topology of Deleuze's philosophical system, as our figure falls and rises at one and the same time. Deleuze is becoming larger; Deleuze is becoming smaller:

Deleuze is falling:

An impulsive, impetuous, involuntary
action.

Deleuze is rising:

A response to complex and unanticipated
relations. We do not yet know what a body
can do.

An act of anti-vitalist, resentment

An affirmation of life though the suppression
of its newly impoverished form.

An egoistic gesture.

The death of ego through a becoming
imperceptible.

The most hypocritical instant.

The rejection of chronos – a stoic and
eventual death that speaks for all of time.

A manifestation of moral weakness and a
surrender to despair.

A creative ethical exploration - an opening
to the ultimate outside.

The most selfish of actions.

A sparing of friends.

If Deleuze's suicide was this staged a crime, then it was a crime of space and measured time, a crime of spatio-temporal dimensions – even if brought about by a lack of oxygen, or by an oversupply of pure and exact air. As we have seen, for those suffering the deprivations of Deleuze's pulmonary condition, this can result in an anomalous mental state brought about in the living subject – a peculiarly afflicted condition of spatial dimensions: psychasthenia, that final 'temptation by space' identified by Roger Caillois (1984) as a kind of mimicry, and which we might relate to what Tschumi defines as the spatial erotics of border crossing:

Architecture will define the places where reality meets fantasy, reason meets madness, life meets death (Border crossing is erotic). (Buckley 2014: 177)

With this in mind, we are in a position to consider the perhaps inseparable assemblages of Deleuze-Guattari and Deleuze-Oxygen Machine in the context of the scene of the crime, alongside the now somewhat constrained and trammelled flows of desiring production. In each case we will suggest a motive on the part of the assemblage.

XI. A Sado-Masochistic Assemblage

In the case of the assemblage 'Deleuze-Oxygen machine' we must consider the more altruistic mode of euthanasia. Deleuze's suffering in the last stages of his life is well documented, and it reaches far beyond the picture of limited mobility that we have presented thus far (Dosse 2011: 16, 251, 497, 498; Beckman : 106-108). He had recently been subjected to a tracheotomy, was in great pain much of the time and frequently felt as if he was being subjected to suffocation. The depiction of Deleuze, in great discomfort much of the time, having to regulate the equipment that kept him alive, whilst engaging in a process of extended waiting and of self-objectification, brings to the fore the accounts of the sadistic and/or masochistic life that are developed in *Coldness and Cruelty* (1991), and later, in *A Thousand Plateaus* (1987).

It perhaps comes as no surprise that the image of the dog – one of Deleuze's least favourite of animals, (Stivale 2020) - is so prominent in the writings of Leopold von Sacher-Masoch:

Consider that you are little better now than a dog or an object; you are my thing, the toy that I can break if it gives me a moment of pleasure. You are nothing, I am everything; do you understand?" She began to laugh and kissed me again. A shudder ran through me. (Deleuze and Sacher-Masoch 1991: 196)

In order to understand why Deleuze might seek ultimately to become untethered from the apparatus that was sustaining his life, it is important to appreciate the affective dimension of resistance that Deleuze attributed to practices of sadism and masochism – but also his notion that these are self-contained orientations which bear no relation to one another, and which could not combine to perform a ‘sado-masochistic’ coupling. Our contention here is that, in the last stages of Deleuze’s life the assemblage ‘Deleuze-Oxygen Machine’ had become a sadomasochistic affront to Deleuzian philosophy – a sadomasochistic machinic assemblage of desire – albeit one enshrined in natural as opposed to moral law.

In *Coldness and Cruelty*, Deleuze writes on the affectively disruptive strategies of sadism and masochism. Whilst each in their own way questions the status of common and good sense, they are, for Deleuze, nevertheless to be considered fundamentally incompatible dispositions (Reynolds 2006: 89, 90). Notably, Deleuze was dismissive of the role of pain in the context of either sadism or masochism. He wrote that the real concerns of the sadist and the masochist are those of rule, order, imagination and temporality. Thus, sadism stands as a disregard for all forms of law, through the institution of a power that is in some sense superior – it is a ‘crowned anarchy’ of principles – a creation of principles that are reasoned in excess of themselves (ibid. p. 92).

Masochism, on the other hand, is a way of performatively drawing attention to the way in which law betrays its initial institution in a kind of consensual social contract. Masochism performs and enacts, in perpetuity, an unjustifiably severe law. For Deleuze neither sadism nor masochism concern the experience of pain per se, but rather they each address incompatible modes of temporality – firstly the acceleration of time in its sadistic quantification - and secondly the stretching or prolongation of time - in an approximation of the time of Aion - through the attenuated waiting and the imaginative reverie of the masochist

(ibid. p.107). With this in mind, we can see the leaning of Deleuze's own philosophical thought towards this image of masochism, whilst also appreciating the incommensurability of the sadist and masochist's antithetical attitudes towards temporality.

In caring for himself in his later days, Deleuze will have become the very conflation of terms that he went to such lengths to keep philosophically separate. Which is to say that Deleuze will have become an element in a sado-masochistic coupling - forced to perform each of these component roles simultaneously. When oxygenating himself, he will have routinely subjected himself to principles of calculation and measure – the setting of the flow control, the squeezing of its trigger – he would have needed to embody the hysterically accelerated rationality of the sadist in order that he might, with the now not so simple act of breathing, engage in a critically performative act of enunciation that would facilitate the atemporal imaginative reverie of the masochist. Deleuze foregrounds this tension, and incommensurability when he tells us that “The masochist *needs* to believe that they are dreaming even when they are not, but sadism needs to be actual ... [the sadist needs] to believe that they are not dreaming even when they are.” (ibid. p. 103)

The question of Deleuze's suicide must be directed not only towards the kind of physical pain that Deleuze would have endured on a daily basis, or to the extent that his everyday actions and activities would become circumscribed, but also towards the kind of subjectivity that would emerge through this thoroughly conflicted mode of temporality, and this incommensurably contradictory set of embodied desires. This is perhaps itself comparable to the dark space of psychasthenia where hallucinating voices cross and mingle (Cailliois 1984:30). Thus, we might ask if it was the differencing of Deleuze, divided through with the differencing of the oxygen machine (dy/dx) that necessitated or intensified the pull of the exterior? Was it the simultaneous demand of the accelerated speeds of sadism divided

through with the decelerating slownesses of masochism that first short circuited Deleuze's flows of desire and subsequently opened them out into the void? By recognising the multiplicity of elements that constitute both the ever-transforming agencement (assemblage) of Deleuze's suicide, and the widely ramified sense of discomfort that accompanies such an act, we propose a disjunctive synthesis of impulsive and rational elements alike.

With this image of lived philosophical paradox still fresh in our minds, we may turn to the assemblage of Guattari-Deleuze – also arguably an oxygen machine of sorts. We have already considered Guattari's role as oxygenator to the thought of Deleuze in the context of their collaboration. There are still, however, a number of ways in which the spectre of Guattari might have influenced Deleuze's demise. Guattari stood to gain little from Deleuze's murder. Indeed, it is unlikely that his biggest regret would have been not living to see Deleuze die. If Guattari, or his ghost, was in some way implicated in Deleuze's demise, it is perhaps best to consider this an act of manslaughter – as though the air being fed was in some way tainted. Perhaps it was the seeding of the idea of the pragmatic life that served ultimately to poison the air that Guattari supplied – or which served to draw attention to the thinness of the air at philosophical heights – and to instil instead the concrete as an attractor.

XII. The Crime of the Scene

Tschumi's advertisement was produced in the late 1970's as the accumulation of something of an obsession with crime and the crime scene. This was approximately ten years after Deleuze had first written about crime fiction in 1966 (Deleuze 2004: 300) – and some twenty years prior to the time when architectural deconstruction turned away from the textual and towards the computational. This was the moment when the thought of Deleuze became most associated with architectural practice. In this sense, we might begin to imagine Deleuze's suicide as a crime of border crossing, or as a confusion of the

windowless monad with the desire for the window itself. For Tschumi, the noir mystery as a genre, was architectural in character and full of forensic insight. The diagrams of Tschumi's *Manhattan Transcripts* (1994) offer a detailed exposition of our own design fictioning of the site of Deleuze's own urban criminality. Crime, for Tschumi, was just another way to use a specifically architectural context, crime reveals how people attempt to use or misuse the built environment (Manaugh 2016:197) and in this way, we can characterise Deleuze's suicide as criminal, or as a form of self-murder. The perpetrator of such a crime, however, is more like the rogue architectural critic - analysing architecture for its devices and spatial tricks. In an architectural murder, the building itself must accomplice to the crime - even when that building is a philosophical system.

Arguably, Guattari's pragmatic oxygenation instituted a more grounded and transdisciplinary form of post-Deleuzianism. Indeed, *A Thousand Plateaus* (first published in 1980) impacted upon architecture some time before Deleuze's sole authored writing on *The Fold* (first published in 1988). Thus, it was in the context of Deleuze's collaboration with Guattari, that he might first be said to have been an accomplice to architecture in what amounted to a double escapade. Accordingly, it was perhaps Guattari's oxygenation of Deleuze that enabled the computational appropriation of Deleuze's work – brought about through the conflation of the digital and temporal senses of virtuality in computationally mediated architectural design (Massumi 2007: 137).

We can consider this problem of architectural appreciation, against the backdrop of the computational turn in architecture and its coincidence with Deleuze's death, a turn also associated with a curving and modulated vector or projectile arc of the subject-object, the terminal modulation of Deleuze, 'dividual and falling, se rabat sur, against the edifice of architecture, and against the façade of his own architectural and philosophical system.

Ultimately Deleuze's architectural fall facilitated a falling back into the disciplinary plane of architecture after the publication of Bernard Cache's book, *Earth Moves*, in which Cache develops - in parallel with Deleuze in *The Fold* - a notion of the technical object as 'objectile' (Cache 1995: 87-100). Once subjected to codification, Cache's notion became divested of the radically new, and premised instead upon purely parametric differentiation (Hales 2015).

A suicide-planners guide to a window becomes an alternative form of architectural criticism –a meditation on the human lung, exact air and Utopia to contest the claims of Le Corbusier's Radiant City:

'But then where is Utopia, where the temperature is 64.4°?...

...And why the devil do men insist on living in difficult or dangerous climates?

Since the machine age, the product of progress, has disturbed everything, couldn't it also give us the means to salvation?

...I seek the remedy, I seek the constant; I find the human lung. With adaptability and intelligence, let's give the lung the constant which is the prerequisite of its functioning: exact air.

...Let's manufacture exact air: filters, driers, humidifiers, disinfectors.

Machines of childish simplicity.

...Send exact air into men's lungs, at home, at the factory, at the office, at the club and the auditorium: ventilators, machines so often used, but so often used badly!

(Le Corbusier 1967: 42)

Whilst Le Corbusier would section the functioning of a window into different and discrete machinic operations, Deleuze would seek different advantages to overcome the limits of his own mobility, breathing, and speech, by exploring the relation of these limits to the functional operation of the window, and the functional operation of his oxygen machine - considered alongside his intolerably sadomasochistic condition. This perhaps presented a choice between masochistically enduring the unknown potentials of the contaminated city air or embracing the sadistic purity of his oxygen device.

Conclusion

In his own writings on the subject of death, in *Difference and Repetition*, *The Logic of Sense*, and with Guattari in *Anti-Oedipus*, Deleuze, following Blanchot, suggests that every death is double (Deleuze 1994: 259; Deleuze 1990: 156; Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 330-331). For Blanchot, the first death involves ‘an affirmation of [an individual’s] reality and [their] unique existence’. It is the death which evolves out of, and stands as the terminus of ‘the life where [the same individual] found love, meaning and distress’ (Blanchot 1982: 148). Blanchot rarely addresses the notion of the first death in explicit terms. However, it is most typically interpreted by commentators, to refer to the conventional, physical death of an individual (Columbat 1996: 240; Osaki 2008: 89). In Deleuze’s reading of Blanchot, the first death, can be seen as an ‘actual’ death - a terrestrial death, located in historical time, which, in the case of Deleuze, is dated November 4th, 1995. For Deleuze, the first death, sutures and consolidates an individual’s identity (*I die*). That is to say, in the absence of any further becoming, it is finally possible to assess or describe the life of the deceased (Deleuze 1994: 113; Osaki 2008: 90).

For Blanchot, the second, ‘ungraspable’ death, proves more elusive. It is entirely non-relational – it is ‘a time without a present’, a time ‘toward which I cannot go forth’, and a time where I have ‘fallen from the power to die’ (Blanchot 1982: 116, 154). Writing in a more impersonal register, Blanchot will suggest of the second death, that ‘In it, *they* die; they do not cease, and they do not finish dying’, and that we learn by virtue of this context ‘to turn toward the invisible, *to feel the movement of transmutation* and, in this movement, to transmute transmutation itself, to the point where it becomes the purity of death purified of dying’ (Blanchot 1982: 152-154).

Deleuze reads Blanchot as foregrounding the atemporality of the second death, stressing its incorporeal, infinitive, and Aionic nature. Accordingly, Deleuze will suggest that ‘every event is like death’ in so far as they are likewise corporeally and incorporeally doubled. For Deleuze the second death expresses the many tiny, and often imperceptible vital-deaths that are involved in any processes of change – ‘*they* die’, he avers, in much the same way as ‘*it* rains’ (Deleuze 1994: 259; Deleuze 1990: 152). It is in this sense that we might regard the second death as the pure and impersonal form of transformation, and as the condition of becoming itself.

When seen from the perspective of the first, actual and chronological death, the image of an accident offers stasis, and sadness, along with a heightened sense of tragedy. However, with the addition of deliberation, and the seeming contradiction that ensues, it is all too easy to feel that Deleuze committed an at once mortal and philosophical suicide. As we have seen, such thoughts (and passions) would seem to have provided the impetus for many early attempts to save Deleuze’s philosophical system from the hand of Deleuze himself. In the context of this paper, we have presented such accounts in post-rationalistic

terms, as reactive reterritorializations, or as symptoms of the machinations of a closed ‘Deleuzian’ society.


Considering Deleuze’s final moments under the aspect of the second death, however, offers another, more productive way through our sorrow. Here, feelings of *ressentiment* give way, via the concept of counter-actualisation, to a more tender and affectionate lament, serving ultimately to constitute an image of a warmer, good humoured, and overtly philosophical suicide – a death that is perhaps most resonant with Lyotard’s eulogy, that ‘He would laugh, he laughs, he is here’, and perhaps a little more sentimentally ‘That’s your stupid sorrow, says he.’ (Columbat 1996: 246).

For Blanchot the second death is fundamentally characterised by invisibility and non-relation – it literally has ‘nothing to do with me [or with you, for that matter]’ (Blanchot 1982:103). As a consequence, we will never really know whether Deleuze took his own life, was murdered, or simply fell to his death. Perhaps it is the inevitability of Deleuze’s silence, rather than any lack of definitive motive, which serves as the condition for the perpetual transformation of Deleuzian thought. That is to say, an edifice, divested of its architect, becomes more easily, transformed, inflected, overgrown, and otherwise expressed anew, through an openness to its outside(s).

Accordingly, in the case of Deleuze’s passing, what we think of as the ‘scene of the crime’ must encompass the events that occurred when Deleuze, as the occupant of a specific architecture – be it philosophical or otherwise – did something radically out of sequence, aiming through a creative act of misuse, to transform the function of the window.

With this in mind, and in an attempt to further complexify the assemblage of Deleuze’s suicide, we envisage a final *masochistic* imperative, which constitutes a folding of the

potentials of the nomadic and monadic life, a disjunctive-synthesis of emotional and philosophical discomfort(s), and a beckoning for a people to come. Choosing to resist a somewhat relentless, paradoxical mode of being, which encompassed both physical and philosophical pain, we see Deleuze impulsively turn towards the at once smoother, frictionless and less angular paradoxes of Aion – whilst simultaneously instituting a displacement of self, that would serve to forever complexify the assemblage of his death. This was an act of masochistic enunciation - an act of finality that stood in defiance of all sadistic measure – a terminal performance, (to be) timelessly endured.



[Image redacted: Bernard Tschumi, Annotation and performance of *Fireworks at Parc de la Villette*. Paris, 1992]

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